University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 90

Issue 1

Article 6

October 2021

Reifying Anderson-Burdick: Voter Protection in the Time of
Pandemic and Beyond
Keeley Gogul

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr
Part of the Election Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Law and Politics
Commons

Recommended Citation
Keeley Gogul, Reifying Anderson-Burdick: Voter Protection in the Time of Pandemic and Beyond, 90 U.
Cin. L. Rev. (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/6

This Student Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of
Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information,
please contact ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Gogul: Reifying Anderson-Burdick

REIFYING ANDERSON-BURDICK: VOTER PROTECTION IN THE
TIME OF PANDEMIC AND BEYOND
Keeley B. Gogul

I. INTRODUCTION
During the Fall of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic continued to affect
the world in unrelenting waves, with the United States leading the way in
both infections and deaths.1 As Election Day2 approached, the pandemic
showed no sign of abating, triggering a series of lawsuits concerning state
election laws.3 These cases arose first with ballot initiative challenges,
where potential candidates and voters claimed that state laws mandating
the number and type of signatures required for ballot initiatives placed a
severe burden on citizens’ First Amendment rights in light of the COVIDimposed lockdowns, stay-at-home orders, social distancing mandates and
a generalized fear of the virus. Relatedly, the virus’s disproportionate
impact on people of color, the elderly, and low-income citizens became
apparent, raising claims that state voter registration laws have a
discriminatory impact.4
An important issue at the heart of many of these election law cases is
what level of scrutiny a court should apply to challenges to state election
laws. Little v. Reclaim Idaho5 was one of many ballot initiative cases
working its way through the trial courts in the midst of the COVID-19
pandemic. Writing for the concurrence on July 30, 2020, United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts identified a circuit split regarding
the proper analysis for ballot initiative cases challenged on First
Amendment grounds.6 The split involves the Sixth and Ninth circuits on
one side and the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh on the other.7 The circuit
split hinges on balancing the state’s interests with the First Amendment
rights of its citizens. The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits require some
degree of scrutiny anytime a regulation burdens a person’s ability to place
an initiative on the ballot.8 The other circuits have held that no First
1. John Elfein, Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the U.S. – Statistics & Facts, STATISA (Oct. 12,
2020), https://www.statista.com/topics/6084/coronavirus-covid-19-in-the-us/.
2. November 3, 2020.
3. As of Oct. 23, there were 414 lawsuits pending. COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker,
STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY ELECTIONS PROJECT, https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/cases.
4. For a list of cases by state, see Voting Rights Litigation 2020, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
(July 28, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/voting-rights-litigation-2020.
5. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Amendment burden exists, and therefore no analysis of the state’s interest
is required so long as the state law in question does not limit political
discussion or petition circulation.9
This Comment examines the evolution of that circuit split and
concludes that the analyses used by the First, Sixth, and Ninth circuits
(the “Anderson-Burdick” test or variations thereof) are more faithful to
the Constitution, closely follow Supreme Court precedent, and when
applied correctly, are structured in a way that avoids sweeping too
broadly. This Comment will show how Anderson-Burdick, while initially
developed in the context of ballot initiative cases, could provide extra
protections for voters in cases where state election laws are being
challenged on the ground that they have a discriminatory impact due to
COVID-19. These protections could be especially important as the
Roberts’ Court continues to engage in what seems to be a “crusade” to
roll back protections for voters’ rights.10
Section II of this Comment traces the development of AndersonBurdick, as well as ways the courts have struggled to apply it. Section
II(B) analyzes the circuit split Chief Justice Roberts identified in his
majority opinion in Reclaim Idaho, revealing that the cases he used to
illustrate the circuit split were inapposite, and actually supported the use
of the framework as applied by the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.
Section II(C) also reviews COVID-19’s disparate impact on racial and
other minorities and explains how courts are using Anderson-Burdick to
resolve cases arising as a result of the disparity. Finally, Section III
demonstrates how the test’s shortcomings are proving to be strengths,
particularly when it is combined with other analyses in context of the
Voting Rights Act. Section III argues that Anderson-Burdick should be
adopted by all the circuits in order to ensure robust voter protections and
avoid mass disenfranchisement.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section begins by tracing the development and application of
Anderson-Burdick in the context of First Amendment challenges to ballot
9. Id.
10. Ian Millhiser, Chief Justice Roberts’s Lifelong Crusade Against Voting Rights, Explained,
VOX, (Sep. 18, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/21211880/supreme-court-chief-justice-john-roberts-voting-rights-act-election2020; see also Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right
Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2016); Lydia Hardy, Voter
Suppression Post-Shelby: Impacts and Issues of Voter Purge and Voter ID Laws, 71 MERCER L. REV. 857
(2020).
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initiative laws. Section II(B) illustrates how the circuit split developed.
Section II(C) includes an analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Crawford v. Marion County, the most recent case in which the Court
addressed Anderson-Burdick.11 Section II(D) discusses the circuit split
regarding the application of Anderson-Burdick in ballot initiative cases
arising specifically as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and
acknowledged by Chief Justice Roberts in Reclaim Idaho. Section II(E)
concludes with a discussion of the disparate impact COVID-19 is having
on racial minorities, voters with disabilities, the elderly, and low-income
Americans and how these disparities are amplifying existing barriers to
voting for these citizens.
A. Developing the Framework
In ballot initiative cases, the First, Sixth, and Ninth circuits have
adopted the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick balancing test to
determine whether or not a state’s professed interest outweighs the burden
it imposes on voters’ First Amendment rights. 12 The Supreme Court
recognized that state regulation of ballot initiatives potentially burdens
free speech when the regulations “limit political expression”13 or
“significantly inhibit communication with voters about proposed political
change.”14 Anderson-Burdick applies a sliding scale analysis to ballot
initiative laws based on the degree of burden the laws place on voters’
First Amendment rights. The test developed from two Supreme Court
cases where state ballot initiative laws were challenged under the First
Amendment.15
The first part of Anderson-Burdick developed from a case challenging
Ohio’s early filing deadline for independent candidates. 16 In Anderson v.
Celebreeze, the Supreme Court determined that state laws placing a
burden on voters’ constitutional rights must withstand strict scrutiny.17
The Court held that an Ohio statute that required an independent
presidential candidate to file a statement of candidacy and supporting
nominating petition five months prior to the general election
unconstitutionally burdened the voting and associational rights of that

11. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
12. The Ninth Circuit refers to the same test as the Angle v. Miller test, but there is no substantive
difference between the tests. For purposes of this Comment, “Anderson-Burdick” test will encompass the
Ninth Circuit as well.
13. Meyer v. Grant, 489 U.S. 414, 417 (1988).
14. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999).
15. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
16. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780.
17. Id.
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candidate’s supporters.18 The Court articulated the legal standard for
challenges to a state’s election laws:
[A] court must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments…then evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment,
the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of
these interests, it must also consider the extent to which those interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.19

The Court held Ohio’s filing deadline burdened the associational rights of
non-party voters and candidates.20 In addition, it “place[d] a significant
state-imposed restriction” on the national election because the President
and Vice President necessarily represented all voters, and therefore votes
cast in one state impacted citizens in all states because those votes
affected the outcome of the federal elections.21 The Court noted that the
deadline disproportionately limited political participation by an
identifiable political group, which made it difficult for the State to support
its early filing law.22
Ohio asserted three interests in reply: (1) an interest in allowing voters
sufficient time to educate themselves about the candidate; (2) an interest
in equal treatment for party candidates and independents; and (3) an
interest in political stability.23 The Court rejected these arguments as
justification for the significant burdens the law placed on candidates and
voters. The Court reasoned that “if the State has open to it a less drastic
way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative
scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal
liberties.”24 In other words, a state law that burdens constitutional rights
must be narrowly-tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest; it must
withstand strict scrutiny.
The second half of Anderson-Burdick, set forth in Burdick v. Takushi,
refined the strict scrutiny analysis from Anderson by adding a balancing
test to determine the degree of scrutiny required.25 In Burdick, the
Supreme Court considered whether Hawaii's prohibition on write-in votes
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.26 The case began with a

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 781.
Id.
Id. at 792-93.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 806 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973)).
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
Id.
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challenge to Hawaii election laws that prohibited write-in voting. Upon
certification of questions by the district court regarding the
constitutionality of write-in votes, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that
write-in votes were barred by Hawaii laws and these laws were consistent
with its Constitution.27
The district court then granted the petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment and injunctive relief but stayed the orders pending appeal.28 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the burden imposed by the prohibition
on write-in votes was justified, because the state provided other
procedures that ensured easy access to the ballot and alternative ways for
the petitioner to express his political beliefs.29 The court expressly
declined to follow the lead of the Fourth Circuit, which held that
fundamental rights were implicated by the casting and counting of writein votes, and therefore any state laws burdening those rights were
unconstitutional if they could not withstand strict scrutiny.30 The Supreme
Court thus granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on this issue between
the Ninth and Fourth Circuit.31
The Court rejected the argument that any law that burdens the right to
vote must be subject to strict scrutiny.32 Instead, the Court explained that
laws governing elections “invariably impose some burden upon
individual voters” and held that requiring every regulation to survive strict
scrutiny would “tie the hands of the States” and prevent them from
regulating fair and disciplined elections.33 The Court introduced a new
element to the standard set forth in Anderson, holding that courts should
first determine the degree of burden on First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights and then apply the proportionate amount of scrutiny to the attendant
state laws.34 Applying this analysis, the Court held that the state’s law
prohibiting write-in votes imposed “only a limited burden” on voters’
First Amendment rights and Hawaii’s interest in protecting the integrity
of its elections provided adequate justification for the law.35
Thus, Anderson and Burdick combine to create a balancing test which
“weighs the burdens’ on voters rights by a particular voting law or
practice against asserted state interests; the heavier the burden on voters’
rights recognized by the court, the stricter the judicial scrutiny.”36
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Burdick v. Takushi, 776 P.2d 824 (1989).
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 431.
Id.
Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election L., 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989).
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432.
Id.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 439.
Richard L. Hasen, Three Pathologies of American Voting Rights Illuminated by the COVID-
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B. To Apply or Not to Apply
Since Burdick, some circuits have applied Anderson-Burdick to cases
challenging ballot initiative laws generally.37 By contrast, other circuits
dispense with any sort of review, arguing that as long as the election law
in question does not directly limit political discussion or petition
circulation, the First Amendment is not implicated.38 This Section
examines cases from the First and Tenth Circuits that illustrate the
difference.
The First Circuit has established a standard for determining what level
of scrutiny to apply when faced with First Amendment challenges to
ballot initiative laws.39 In Wirzburger v. Galvin, the court held that laws
having only incidental effects on speech did not implicate the First
Amendment and must withstand only rational basis review, but laws
prohibiting ballot initiatives on a particular subject constituted a
restriction on speech sufficient to trigger intermediate scrutiny.40
Wirzburger concerned an effort by parents to amend the Massachusetts
Constitution via popular initiative.41 Because the initiative proposed to
eliminate a prohibition on state funding for private schools with religious
affiliations, it was excluded from the initiative process by a provision of
the Massachusetts Constitution which prohibited petitions that explicitly
related to “religious institutions.”42 The parents argued that this exclusion
violated their First Amendment rights because it was a “content-based
restriction on core political speech,” and thus should be subject to strict
scrutiny.43
Applying Anderson-Burdick,44 the First Circuit initially considered the
burden the state law placed on the First Amendment.45 The court
determined the use of the initiative process constituted expressive conduct
and involved core political speech, thus implicating the First
Amendment.46 As the court explained, ballot initiatives “provide[] a
19 Pandemic, and How to Treat and Cure Them, 19 ELECTION L.J. 263, 272 (2020).
37. See e.g., Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012), Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271,
278 (1st Cir. 2005); SawariMedia, LLC v. Whitmer, 963 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2020).
38. See e.g., Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, 892 F.3d 935 (7th Cir.); Initiative and Referendum
Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006); Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir.
1997).
39. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 278 (1st Cir. 2005).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 275.
43. Id.
44. The court does not explicitly reference Anderson-Burdick by name but applies each element
of the framework.
45. Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 276.
46. Id.
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uniquely provocative method of spurring public debate” and thus
constitute core political speech according to Supreme Court precedent.47
However, the court recognized that the regulation at issue did not directly
target communicative impact, but rather was “aim[ed] at preventing the
act of generating…constitutional amendments about certain subjects by
initiative.”48 Therefore, the court found the burden on speech was
incidental to the law and strict scrutiny was not required.49 However,
because the “expression is affected by the regulations of the state initiative
process,” the court determined that intermediate scrutiny was warranted.50
Accordingly, the court moved to the second step of the analysis and
examined the state’s interest in regulating the ballot initiative process. The
court concluded the state’s interest in maintaining the proper
constitutional balance between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause was substantial.51 The court then balanced the
burden on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights with the substantial
interest of the state, holding that because the statutes were narrowly
tailored, they survived intermediate scrutiny.52
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit rejected this analysis in Initiative &
Referendum Institute v. Walker, even while expressly acknowledging that
doing so created a circuit split.53 In Walker, the Plaintiffs claimed that a
Utah state law that required supermajority approval of wildlife
management ballot initiatives imposed a “chilling effect” on the exercise
of citizens’ First Amendment rights.54 In “respectfully disagreeing” with
the First Circuit, the court held that such a provision fell short of
implicating freedom of speech at all.55
Sitting en banc, the Tenth Circuit declined to consider the regulation’s
incidental effects on speech or communicative conduct.56 Instead, the
court stated that the degree of scrutiny required turned on whether the
laws in question “regulate or restrict the communicative conduct of
persons advocating a position in a referendum” or whether the laws
simply govern the process of enacting legislation.57 According to the
court, the former trigger strict scrutiny and the latter require no

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 275.
Id. at 279.
Id.
Id. at 276.
Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1100.
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constitutional scrutiny at all.58 Although the court agreed that the First
Amendment afforded protection to the political speech surrounding a
ballot initiative, it held that it did not provide any guarantees that all points
of view are “equally likely to prevail.”59 Therefore, intermediate scrutiny
does not apply to laws that structure elections even when they make some
outcomes harder to achieve than others.60 The court rejected the Plaintiff’s
alternative argument that the legislation is not content-neutral on the same
grounds; the regulation at issue in this case regulated process rather than
speech.61 Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, First Amendment analysis
was unwarranted in this case and Utah’s law was upheld without review.
Judge Lucero dissented and faulted the court’s decision because it
“free[d] from constitutional scrutiny conduct by a majority of voters that
has the potential to chill political speech on the basis of content by
imposing discriminatory election requirements.”62 The dissent went on to
say that states cannot “rig election laws” by applying content-based
supermajority requirements without running afoul of the First
Amendment.63 Drawing a comparison between rigged election laws such
as this one and partisan gerrymandering, Judge Lucero's dissent
referenced the dissent in the gerrymandering case Veith v. Jubelirer,
where Justice Kennedy stated that “First Amendment concerns arise
where a State enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a
group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason of their
views.”64 Should those circumstances arise, Justice Kennedy advised that
First Amendment violations can only be alleviated if the State
demonstrates a compelling interest in that law.65 According to Judge
Lucero, the Wirzburger court’s First Amendment analysis was proper for
ballot initiative cases because it allowed the State to prevail if the law in
question survived intermediate scrutiny.
C. The Supreme Court’s Guidance (or Lack Thereof) Concerning
Anderson-Burdick
The Supreme Court has directly addressed Anderson-Burdick only
once since the emergence of the circuit split, issuing a plurality opinion
in Crawford v. Marion County that resulted in two conflicting

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1099, 1102.
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1110 (Lucero, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1112 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004)) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
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interpretations of Anderson-Burdick.66 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, expressly
applied Anderson-Burdick to an Indiana statute requiring voters to have a
form of government-issued photo identification in order to vote.67 Stevens
found that Indiana’s “precise interests” in preventing voter fraud and
protecting the integrity of elections did not unconstitutionally burden
voters.68 Additionally, when Petitioners asked the Court to consider the
burden placed on a specific subset of the voter population rather than the
population as a whole, the Court conceded that such a burden may
necessitate a higher degree of scrutiny and therefore a more compelling
and narrowly tailored state law.69 However, the Court held that the
Petitioner failed to prove that such a burden existed and therefore did not
rule on the question.70
Writing separately and concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia,
together with Justices Thomas and Alito, faulted the Court for reading
Anderson together with Burdick to create a balancing test.71 Instead,
Justice Scalia insisted that Burdick distilled the Anderson opinion into a
“two-track approach:” laws severely burdening the right to vote trigger
strict scrutiny, while others receive only rational basis review.72
Effectively, Justice Scalia’s binary interpretation disclaimed the
balancing component of Anderson-Burdick and created the divided
approach to applying it at issue today.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia elided the interim step articulated in
Burdick and applied by many lower courts since. Insisting on the “twotrack” approach, Justice Scalia failed to abide by the Burdick court’s
mandate that courts must consider the extent to which the state’s interests
in passing a law require the subsequent burden on voters’ rights created
by the law.73
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens rejected that interpretation,
noting that “[t]he Burdick opinion was explicit in its endorsement and
adherence to Anderson…the Court applied the ‘flexible standard’ set
66. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
67. Id. at 191.
68. Id. at 203.
69. Id. at 202.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 205.
73. The Burdick court explicitly stated that “A court considering a challenge to a state election law
must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.’” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, at
434, (1992) (emphasis added) (first quoting Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983): and then
quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 213 (1986)).
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forth in Anderson.”74
Justice Souter authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, and explicitly endorsed and applied the combined AndersonBurdick framework with its sliding scale of scrutiny.75 Thus, in the
Crawford decision, five justices affirmed the use of Anderson-Burdick,
three justices viewed it as a binary test only, and a single Justice evaluated
the burden from a disproportionate impact perspective.76
Because the Supreme Court has not revisited Anderson-Burdick since
the Crawford plurality opinion, lower courts continue to apply two
different versions of the test—either the flexible standard set forth by
Justice Stevens in the plurality and applied in a separate dissenting
opinion by Justice Souter,77 or the binary, all-or-nothing test advocated
by Justice Scalia in the concurrence. The challenges created by this lack
of clarity are amplified in the context of cases arising as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
D. COVID-19 and the Current Circuit Split
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic strained the American election
system in unprecedented ways. Beginning in mid-March, local and state
governments imposed various restrictions on citizens, ranging from
mandatory stay-at-home orders to limits on the number of people
permitted to gather outdoors.78 By the end of March, more than ninety
percent of the U.S. was under some sort of stay-at-home order.79 The
severity and tenacity of the outbreak in the U.S. led the Centers for
Disease Control to issue special guidance for June’s election polling
locations, encouraging states to expand the number of voting options,
extend the amount of time available for voting, and take additional
measures to protect those at increased risk for severe illness.80

74. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election B., 553 U.S. 191, n. 8 (2008).
75. Id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg all apply
the sliding scale balancing test as understood in Anderson combined with Burdick; Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito apply the binary test. Id.
77. “Given the legitimacy of interests on both sides, we have avoided preset levels of scrutiny in
favor of a sliding-scale balancing analysis: the scrutiny varies with the effect of the regulation at issue.”
Id. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting).
78. Amanda Moreland et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home Orders and
Changes in Population Movement — United States, March 1–May 31, 2020, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
MORBIDITY
AND
MORTALITY
WEEKLY
REP.
(Sep.
4,
2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a2.htm.
79. Elfein, supra note 1.
80. Considerations for Election Polling Locations: Interim Guidance to Prevent Spread of
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (June 22,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html.
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With the election cycle ramping up amid the pandemic, courts were
soon faced with legal challenges to state election laws.81 The increasing
burden on the courts makes it even more imperative that they have a clear
test under which to evaluate challenges to states’ voting laws, but the
cases on either side of the circuit split identified by Chief Justice Roberts
in Reclaim Idaho reveal that the confusion created by the Supreme
Court’s plurality opinion in Crawford remains.
In Reclaim Idaho, the State sought a stay pending appeal from a district
court order requiring Idaho to certify a ballot initiative with less than the
required number of signatures or to allow the initiative more time and
leeway to gather digital signatures online in order to reach the requisite
number in light of the challenges presented by the pandemic.82 The
Supreme Court granted the stay. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts
noted that the Court would likely grant certiorari in the case, were it
requested, in order to resolve a circuit split regarding the proper analysis
to apply to election administration laws challenged under the First
Amendment.83
A brief review of the cases mentioned by the Chief Justice in Reclaim
Idaho provides a useful overview into the application of AndersonBurdick during the pandemic. Contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion,
the circuits are not split on when the test is applicable, but rather on how
to apply it.
The Sixth Circuit applied Anderson-Burdick in two separate pandemicrelated cases.84 The first case challenged Michigan’s signature
requirement during the COVID-19 lockdown.85 In SawariMedia LLC. v.
Whitmer, the Sixth Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay a
preliminary injunction imposed by the district court that enjoined the state
from enforcing its signature requirement for ballot initiatives.86 The State
argued that the district court erred in applying Anderson-Burdick to find
a severe burden on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and further
argued that the court abused its discretion by declining to accept the
State’s proposed extension to the petition deadline.87 The court disagreed
on both counts. The court upheld the lower court’s application of
Anderson-Burdick, which found that the combination of Michigan’s stay81. Pam Fessler, Coronavirus Likely to Supercharge Election-Year Lawsuits Over Voting Rights,
NPR (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/17/836671427/coronavirus-likely-to-superchargeelection-year-lawsuits-over-voting-rights.
82. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020).
83. Id.
84. SawariMedia, LLC v. Whitmer, 963 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2020); Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d
804 (6th Cir. 2020).
85. SawariMedia, 963 F.3d at 595.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 596- 97.
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at-home order and the state’s signature requirement for ballot initiatives
violated the First Amendment by creating a severe restriction on
SawariMedia’s access to the ballot.88 Further, the court noted that the
State proffered no evidence that the district court was obliged to accept
its remedy, and thus the State did not meet its burden of proof that it was
entitled to a stay.89 Finally, the court noted, and the State conceded, that
current Sixth Circuit precedent favored applying Anderson-Burdick to
ballot initiative cases.90
Shortly after SawariMedia was decided, the Sixth Circuit heard
Thompson v. DeWine, where a similar challenge to ballot initiative laws
yielded a different result. Like in Sawari, the plaintiffs filed a First
Amendment action claiming that the combination of Ohio’s ballot
initiative laws and the Governor’s stay-at-home orders presented an
unconstitutional burden on the First Amendment rights of individuals
seeking to include an initiative on the ballot.91 The court applied
Anderson-Burdick and found that because the State included an
exemption to the stay-at-home order for people gathering for First
Amendment reasons, the burden on voters’ rights was only intermediate.92
The court found that the State’s interest in preventing election fraud
justified the burden on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and thus the
state was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim.93 Therefore, the court
reversed the lower court’s granting of the plaintiff’s preliminary
injunction.94
The Thompson court’s analysis closely parallels the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Miller v. Thurston—Chief Justice Roberts contrasted this case
with SawariMedia to illustrate the circuit split regarding how to apply
Anderson-Burdick.95 The plaintiffs in Miller alleged that the combination
of state laws requiring ballot initiative petitions to be signed by in-person
witnesses and notarized together with government restrictions limiting inperson contact in response to the pandemic resulted in an unconstitutional
burden on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.96 The district court
expressly applied Anderson-Burdick and determined that the plaintiffs
88. Id. at 596.
89. Id. at 597.
90. Id.
91. Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020).
92. Id. at 811.
93. Id.; but see Richard Hasen, Direct Democracy Denied: The Right to Initiative During a
Pandemic,
U.
CHI.
L.
REV.
BLOG
(June
26,
2020),
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/26/pandemic-initiative-hasen/ (criticizing the Court’s
reasoning and arguing in support of upholding the district court decision).
94. Thompson, 959 F. 3d at 811.
95. Miller v. Thurston, 967 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2020).
96. Miller v. Thurston, 462 F.Supp. 3d 930 (W.D. Ark.), rev'd, 967 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2020).
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established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court
found that the government’s interest in preventing fraud in the election
process was compelling, but the witness and signature requirements were
not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.97 Accordingly, the district
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.98
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court, but not for
applying Anderson-Burdick. Instead, the court of appeals determined that
only the in-person signature requirement applied in the context of
COVID-19 sufficiently burdened the First Amendment to trigger strict
scrutiny.99 Relying on circuit precedent, the court applied AndersonBurdick’s “sliding standard of review.”100 Therefore, the court found
Anderson-Burdick’s application to the case was appropriate but reversed
the lower court’s determination that the burden on the plaintiffs was
severe.101 Rather, the Eighth Circuit found that the State’s interest in
protecting the integrity of its initiative processes paired with safe
alternatives for satisfying the witness and signature requirements did not
unduly burden the plaintiffs and therefore survived intermediate
scrutiny.102
In all three cases, the lower courts applied Anderson-Burdick and the
appellate courts endorsed its application, establishing Anderson-Burdick
as the applicable analytical test. The circuit split was based not on whether
to apply Anderson-Burdick; the courts divided only in their evaluations of
the states’ interests in passing election laws and the attendant burdens they
placed on voters.
E. COVID-19’s Disparate Impact on Some Voters
The COVID-19 pandemic interacts with voting laws in ways that
directly impact the burden courts must evaluate in election law cases.
Racial minorities, voters with disabilities, the elderly, and low-income
Americans already face barriers to voting based on structural inequities
and racism in the United States election system.103 These disparities are

97. Id. at 942.
98. Id. at 948.
99. Miller, 967 F.3d at 738.
100. Id. at 739.
101. Id. at 741.
102. Id.
103. Samantha Artiga et al., Racial Disparities in COVID-19: Key Findings from Available Data
and Analysis, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Aug. 17, 2020)
https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/racial-disparities-covid-19-key-findingsavailable-data-analysis/; Lilian Aluri, COVID-19 and the Disability Vote, AMERICAN ASSOC. OF PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES (Sep. 2020), https://www.aapd.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/COVID-19-andthe-Disability-Vote.pdf.
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amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic.104
Research reveals that people with disabilities are more susceptible to
contracting COVID-19 and frequently endure comorbidities resulting in
complications and higher instances of death.105 Data collected in New
York state found that people with disabilities are 2.5 times more likely to
die of COVID-19.106 When combined with accessibility challenges and
other barriers to voting that many people with disabilities experience in
election years, COVID-19 is requiring these voters to “make an
impossible decision this election—between protecting [their] health, and
even [their] live[s], and participating in democracy.”107
Similar barriers exist for Black and other minority voters. In particular,
a recent study showed that Blacks who contract COVID-19 are two times
more likely to require hospitalization and three times more likely to die
from the disease than other racial and ethnic groups. 108 Hispanics and
other Latinos are also experiencing higher rates of infection and deaths
than white people in states around the country.109 Like people with
disabilities, Black and other racial minorities already suffer from systemic
voter suppression and disenfranchisement in part by way of fewer
convenient polling locations and longer wait times at the polls.110
COVID-19 amplifies minority voters’ disadvantages. For example,
during Wisconsin’s April primary election, measures undertaken by the
State in response to the pandemic reduced the number of available polling
locations across the state.111 Milwaukee, whose population is 57.6
percent Black, Hispanic, or Latino, had only five polling stations to serve
its population of 592,000—down from the 175 stations it would normally
have.112 Not only did this decision compound the risks for Black and
104. What Democracy Looks Like: Protecting Voting Rights in the US during the COVID-19
Pandemic, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sep. 22, 2020) https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/22/whatdemocracy-looks/protecting-voting-rights-us-during-covid-19-pandemic#.
105. Artiga, supra note 104 at 1.
106. Id. at 11.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Sharon E. Moore et. al., Six Feet Apart of Six Feet Under: The Impact of COVID-19 on the
Black
Community,
DEATH
STUD.
(July
2020),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07481187.2020.1785053.
109. Daniel Wood, As Pandemic Deaths Add Up, Racial Disparities Persist — And In Some Cases
Worsen, NPR (Sep. 23, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/23/914427907/aspandemic-deaths-add-up-racial-disparities-persist-and-in-some-cases-worsen.
110. M. Keith Chen et.al., Racial Disparities in Voting Wait Times: Evidence from Smartphone
Data, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH., Working Paper 26487 (Nov. 2019),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w26487; see also Social Equity and COVID-19: The Case of African
Americans, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 5, 820-26 (2020).
111. John Curiel & Angelo Dagonel, Election Administration Challenges and Effects in Wisconsin,
LAWFARE (Sep. 25, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/election-administration-challenges-and-effectswisconsin.
112. Quick Facts: Milwaukee, Wisconsin, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
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minority voters at disproportionate rates, but it resulted in a demonstrable
increase in COVID-19 cases. According to the Bureau of Economic
Research, “a 10% increase in in-person voters per polling location [was]
associated with an 18.4% increase in the COVID-19 positive test rate two
to three weeks later.”113
Similar burdens on voting during the pandemic exist for other distinct
groups of Americans. Elderly voters are at exceptionally high risk of
contracting the virus and may face additional challenges regarding access
to transportation, technology, and other resources needed to participate in
the election process.114 Similarly, COVID-19 has had a disparate impact
on low-income Americans who experience many of the same burdens as,
and often intersect with, the distinct subsets of voters mentioned above.115
Taken as a whole, when courts fail to protect the rights of these voters,
they run the risk of “massive disenfranchisement” and force voters to
“brave the polls, endangering their own and others' safety… or lose their
right to vote, through no fault of their own.”116
The district court in Thompson recognized the importance of rigorous
voter protections during the pandemic:
[T]hese are not normal times. So, the question is whether the COVID-19
pandemic and Ohio's stay-at-home orders increased the burden that Ohio's
ballot-initiative regulations place on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
rights. We must answer this question from the perspective of the people
and organizations affected by Ohio's ballot initiative restrictions and
considering all opportunities these parties had to exercise their rights.117

Because of its burden-specific focus, Anderson-Burdick, including the
rigorous interrogation of the state’s proffered interests, provides the
courts with a means of addressing these issues.
District courts can and do apply Anderson-Burdick to resolve
challenges to state election laws in light of the pandemic. For example, in
People First of Alabama v. Merrill, the plaintiffs were a group of senior
citizens who also had disabilities or underlying medical conditions.118 The
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/milwaukeecitywisconsin (last visited Dec. 4, 2020); See also Hasen,
supra note 35 at 264.
113. Chad D. Cotti et.al., The Relationship Between In-Person Voting and COVID-19, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH., Working Paper 27187 (May 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27187.
114. Abigail Abrams, Nursing Home Residents Struggle to Vote Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic,
TIME (Oct. 10, 2020), https://time.com/5898746/elderly-covid-election-2020/.
115. Wyatt Koma, et. al., Low-Income and Communities of Color at Higher Risk of Serious Illness
if
Infected
with
Coronavirus,
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
(May
7,
2020),
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/low-income-and-communities-of-color-at-higherrisk-of-serious-illness-if-infected-with-coronavirus/.
116. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1209, 1211 (2020),
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117. Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2020).
118. People First of Alabama v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (N.D. Ala. 2020).
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plaintiffs challenged Alabama election laws requiring witnesses to be
present for absentee ballots, submission of photo ID for absentee voters,
and prohibitions on curbside voting, arguing that these measures violated
their fundamental right to vote in light of the pandemic.119 Considering
the severity of the burden that absentee ballot witness requirements placed
on voters, the court acknowledged that the requirements imposed a “more
significant burden” on voters at increased risk of COVID-19
complications because of their “age, disability,…and race.”120 The court,
relying on the plurality’s use of Anderson-Burdick in Crawford, closely
analyzed the state’s proffered interest in reducing election fraud. The
court found that the desire to reduce election fraud, though reasonable,
did not justify the burden that the witness requirements placed on the
plaintiffs’ voting rights.121 After similar analysis, the court concluded that
both the photo ID requirement and the ban on curbside voting failed
intermediate scrutiny, and therefore the plaintiffs were likely to succeed
on the merits.122
Anderson-Burdick’s inherent flexibility suggests it could be used to
adjudicate other election law cases, particularly those arising under § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Currently, the Supreme Court’s guidance
regarding § 2 VRA claims comes from Thornburg v. Gingles, a vote
dilution case where challenges were brought against the use of
multimember districts in North Carolina’s legislative apportionment. In
determining whether or not plaintiffs had a valid claim under § 2 of the
VRA, the Court held that a § 2 vote dilution claim exists when the voting
rule or practice in question “interacts with social and historical conditions
to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [B]lack and white
voters.”123
There is a significant body of scholarly commentary discussing
potential challenges to § 2 of the VRA,124 including the Court’s decision
in Shelby County v. Holder, which held that § 5 of the VRA was
unconstitutional.125 Many scholars fear that the current conservative
majority on the Court will look for ways to similarly dismiss § 2 and thus

119. Id.
120. Id. at 1207.
121. Id. at 1213.
122. Id.
123. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
124. See Christopher Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional
Elections, and Common Claw Statutes, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 377, 416 (2012); Janai Nelson, The Causal
Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 586 (2013); Hayden Johnson, Vote Denial and
Defense: A Strategic Enforcement Proposal for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 108 GEORGETOWN L.
J. 449 (2020).
125. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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significantly rollback voter protections.126 As such, these scholars are
hard at work recommending additional standards the Court could apply if
it were to grant certiorari on a § 2 vote denial case.
Without a Supreme Court standard for evaluating vote denial cases,
several district courts have crafted a two-part test that requires plaintiffs
to show that (1) a disparate impact on minorities exists due to the state
practice, and (2) the impact is causally linked to the interaction between
the practice and social and historical conditions.127
Daniel Tokaji, a dean and professor of constitutional and election law
at the University of Wisconsin Law School, identifies Anderson-Burdick
as “the constitutional standard applicable to burdens on electoral
participation,” noting that six justices in Crawford128 held that such a
standard “should govern equal protection challenges to burdens on
electoral participation.”129 According to Tokaji, § 2 vote denial challenges
can be analyzed under two separate constitutional grounds, the right to
vote and the prohibition against intentional discrimination based on race
or other protected class status.130
Tokaji’s proposed test incorporates (with some refinements) the two
elements from the above-mentioned district court test and adds a third
element based on Anderson-Burdick —defendants must “show by clear
and convincing evidence” that the state’s interests in passing the law
outweigh the burden on voting created by it.131 This test gives the state
more room to make its case and potentially assuages any concerns the
Court may have that the first two elements of the test are too easily
satisfied.132 This is important because in cases where § 2 reaches conduct
that does not violate the Constitution, there is a higher likelihood that
justices will disagree on whether or not regulating such conduct
impermissibly extends Congress’s enforcement power.
III. DISCUSSION
The advent of COVID-19 and the resulting burden placed on the courts
by the exploding number of election law challenges calls for AndersonBurdick’s continued use and expanded application. The utility of a wellknown and often-applied doctrine cannot be understated when pandemic126. Johnson, supra note 125 at 493.
127. Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARVARD CIV. RTS.-CIV.
LIBERTIES L. REV. 439, 460 (2015).
128. Id. at 470. Tokaji includes Justice Breyer here, who applied a slightly different test that
nonetheless balanced the burdens on voters against the benefit of the law.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 474.
132. Id. at 485.
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related government measures collide with voting rights in the context of
presidential elections. Courts need a familiar doctrine that can be applied
uniformly in order to resolve as-applied challenges to state voting laws
quicky and fairly. Section III(A) discusses the need for clarity regarding
the proper application of Anderson-Burdick in order to meet this bar.
Section III(B) demonstrates why some of the framework’s potential
shortcomings are actually strengths and how it can be applied in
conjunction with other analyses to ensure robust voter protections are
maintained and reinforced during election related litigation. Section
III(C) establishes that when courts apply the standard diligently, the
framework’s inherent flexibility makes it well-suited for cases arising
during the rapidly changing social conditions, whether brought on by the
pandemic or other social and political factors.
A. Resolving the Circuit Split: The Need for Clarity
The circuit court cases concerning Anderson-Burdick reveal that the
courts are not split on whether to apply the test to challenges related to
the complexities of the pandemic, but rather on how to apply it based on
the two interpretations offered by the Court in Crawford. While some like
Justice Scalia have criticized Anderson-Burdick for its flexibility, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “constitutional challenges to specific
provisions of State election laws…cannot be resolved by any ‘litmuspaper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.”133
Furthermore, the tiers of scrutiny implicated by Anderson-Burdick have a
long history of judicial gravitas stemming from their use in resolving
particularly intractable constitutional issues in the areas of First
Amendment and Due Process jurisprudence,134 making AndersonBurdick a useful and necessary tool. Given the arguments favoring the
doctrine, the question now becomes how to resolve the circuit split
identified by Chief Justice Roberts in Little v. Reclaim Idaho. As the cases
above illustrate, the split is an interpretative one that results in a varied
application of the test.135

133. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,
730 (1974)).
134. The tiered approach to judicial review is rooted in the Equal Protection Clause but has been
expanded throughout the twentieth century as a tool for resolving tensions between “the presumed validity
of government action” and the Constitutional rights of individual citizens. For an overview, see Calvin
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 (2004).
135. For further reading on the apparent trend of federal appellate courts reversing district court
decisions based on differing application of Anderson-Burdick in COVID-related voting cases, see Jim
Rutenberg & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Federal Appeals Courts Emerge as Crucial for Trump in Voting Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/17/us/politics/federal-appeals-courtstrump-voting.html; Hasen, supra note 35.
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The district court opinions in Thompson and Miller and their respective
appellate opinions reveal that the differing outcomes in each case turn on
how rather than when courts apply Anderson-Burdick. Specifically, to
what extent must the courts explore the states’ professed interests and how
insistent must they be that those interests be precise and particularized?
For example, in Thompson, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district
court’s finding that the law in question placed a severe burden on the
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, finding instead that the law created
only an intermediate burden and thus warranted intermediate scrutiny.136
However, in analyzing the state’s interests and the attendant burden
placed on voters, the court failed to conduct the “careful, ground-level
appraisal both of the practical burdens on the right to vote and of the
state's reasons for imposing those precise burdens.”137 Instead, the court
accepted the state’s interests at face value and concluded that the interests
were “compelling and well-established” without any further inquiry.138 In
short, the court never required Ohio to “[put] forth the precise interests
that are served by the ban.”139As a result, the court of appeals granted the
state’s motion to stay the preliminary injunction issued by the district
court without following Anderson-Burdick’s requirement to rigorously
interrogate the state’s interests.140 Without robustly analyzing states’
interests in passing voting laws, the courts may be unduly favoring state
interests at the expense of voters’ rights.
Thompson’s shortcomings are evident when contrasted with the Eighth
Circuit’s opinion in Miller. In Miller, the court also began by analyzing
the degree of scrutiny required based on the burden the contested
regulations placed on the plaintiffs.141 Like the Sixth Circuit in Thompson,
the court of appeals found the burden imposed by the in-person signature
law in Miller failed to rise to the level of severity necessary to trigger
strict scrutiny.142 The court then analyzed the state’s interests involved.
This is where the analyses of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits diverge in
important and material ways regarding their application of AndersonBurdick.
Unlike the Thompson court, the Eighth Circuit followed Supreme
Court precedent,143 engaged in a rigorous review of the specific state’s
interests, and detailed why these interests justified the burden they placed
136. Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2020).
137. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 811.
139. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 448 (1992).
140. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 804.
141. Miller v. Thurston, 967 F.3d 727, 739 (8th Cir. 2020).
142. Id. at 740.
143. See e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796-806 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 45-51 (1976); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439-40 (1992).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 6

278

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90

on the plaintiffs.144 In other words, the court embarked on the analysis
required by the Supreme Court, “shav[ing] down…the generalities raised
by the State” in order to ascertain with a high degree of specificity the
“aspects of claimed interests addressed by the law at issue.” 145 Here, that
analysis began where the Thompson analysis ended, acknowledging the
state’s professed interest in protecting the integrity of its ballot initiative
process.146
In Miller, the court explained that the state’s interest went beyond
simply guarding against corruption and fraud and explained how it also
encompassed preventing mistakes regarding the type of signatures
collected.147 The court provided support for this argument by referencing
additional state statutes that require the use of in-person canvassing to
protect these interests.148 Finally, the court noted that Arkansas had
experienced actual ballot initiative fraud in the past, and therefore the
state’s concerns regarding fraud were substantiated rather than merely
speculative.149 Based on this concrete, particularized, and articulable
analysis, the court then performed the balancing test required under
Anderson-Burdick and found that the state’s interests outweighed the
burden on plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.150
When courts follow Supreme Court guidance in their application of
Anderson-Burdick, the degree of scrutiny applied to analyze the state’s
interest “is not to be made in the abstract, by asking whether [the interests]
are highly significant values; but rather by asking whether the aspect of
[those interests] addressed by the law at issue is highly significant.”151
Tokaji’s addition of the clear and convincing standard to the existing
Anderson-Burdick framework seeks to quantify the rigor required of a
court’s inquiry into the states proffered interests in order to clarify the
application of the test. Although not expressly calling for the clear and
convincing standard, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed a similar
degree of rigor in Anderson, stating:
[A] court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that
parallels its work in ordinary litigation…[i]t must identify and evaluate the
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only
determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Miller, 967 F.3d at 740.
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000) (emphasis deleted).
Miller, 967 F.3d at 740.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 741.
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000).
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must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff's rights.152

When courts faithfully execute this type of inquiry, no matter the case,
Anderson-Burdick becomes less amorphous and provides the courts with
a useful tool, enabling them to decide cases and honor the Supreme
Court’s edict that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under
our constitutional structure.”153
B. Why Potential Shortcomings are Actually Strengths
As pandemic-related election law challenges continue to make their
way through U.S. courts, weaknesses in the American election process
are coming to the forefront. In particular, there is “deep polarization” and
the potential for significant partisanship, with Republicans striving to
make voting more challenging and Democrats favoring laws that lower
barriers to voting and increase enfranchisement.154 Despite being
criticized as too unstructured, Anderson-Burdick’s flexibility
complements other analyses commonly used in these cases, providing
courts with robust measures to resolve increasingly complex election law
litigation.
For example, in cases where the legislature proposes to roll back
previously available options for registering and/or voting, AndersonBurdick standing alone may fall short of providing sufficient clarity to
fully cognize the burden on voters. However, adding a due process
analysis that focuses on “partisan deviations from the norm of fair play,
and the constitutionally appropriate protection of reasonable expectations
from unjustifiable retrogressive unsettling of those expectations”
strengthens Anderson-Burdick and assures voting laws are not tainted
with partisanship.155
The same analysis could apply to cases where the legislature refuses to
change voting laws in light of COVID-19. While application of
Anderson-Burdick is likely to reveal violations of the equal protection
rights of voters at high risk for complications from COVID-19, a
simultaneous due process analysis may reveal partisan motivations for
refusing to adapt to social conditions created by the virus. As Professor
Edward Foley explained, “if one party seeks to control the electoral
process to give itself an unfair advantage, that power grab is a
constitutional problem independent of whether it violates the equal
152. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789–90 (1983).
153. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
154. Hasen, supra note 35 at 268.
155. Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for
Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 746 (2017).
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treatment of similarly situated voters.”156 Thus, the concurrent application
of Anderson-Burdick and a due process analysis of the challenged law
would result in stronger protection of voter rights, countering any partisan
influence that may exist.
The same advantages accrue when applying Anderson-Burdick as part
of the adjudication in vote denial claims, particularly those that arise
under § 2 of the VRA. Some plaintiffs have argued that states’ refusals to
modify election laws for minority voters disproportionately impacted by
the pandemic run afoul of § 2 of the VRA, resulting in vote denial.157 Vote
denial cases “implicate the value of participation…being able to register,
vote, and have one’s vote counted.”158 Therefore, when states refuse to
moderate their election laws to accommodate the increased risks COVID19 imposes on American minority voters, the state impermissibly reduces
those voters’ abilities to participate in elections and therefore violates §
2. Importantly, Tokaji’s test for vote denial claims expressly draws on
Anderson-Burdick as an existing constitutional doctrine, grounding it in
established Supreme Court precedent in order to protect § 2 from a
conservative majority that seems intent on limiting, rather than
expanding, voter protections.159
C. Anderson-Burdick is Uniquely Suited to the Demands of COVIDRelated Election Litigation
For significant subsets of American voters, voting during the pandemic
presents markedly greater challenges.160 As a result, voting regulations
that limit the use of absentee ballots, ban curbside voting, or require that
absentee ballots be signed by a witness are being challenged in court on
the grounds that voters who are at high risk of contracting COVID-19 are
being unduly burdened by these laws.161 The Crawford Court recognized
and endorsed the utility of Anderson-Burdick when analyzing special
burdens that may apply to certain subsections of voters depending on the
facts of a case.162
The comparison of the cases in this Section further validates the utility
of Anderson-Burdick for analyzing ballot initiative cases arising in the
unique legal landscape that the COVID-19 pandemic created.
156. Id. at 749.
157. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
158. Tokaji, supra note 128, at 442.
159. Id. at 473; see also supra note 10.
160. Supra Section II(E).
161. See People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (N.D. Ala. June 15, 2020); Texas
Democratic Party v. Abbott, 461 F.Supp. 3d 406 (W.D. Tex. May 19, 2020), vacated and remanded, 978
F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2020).
162. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008).
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Additionally, proper application of Anderson-Burdick to cases where the
pandemic disproportionately affects certain groups of voters enables the
district courts to ensure that the state “in no way freezes the status quo,
but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American political
life.”163 The fact-specific analyses required by Anderson-Burdick
facilitate the courts’ application of a nuanced, sliding scale of scrutiny
under which the interest of the state in passing a voting law is balanced
against the law’s burden on the voter in those specific circumstances. This
would ensure case outcomes are within the bounds of voters’ First
Amendment rights as well as the similarly-bestowed states’ rights to
“choose among many permissible options when designing elections.”164
IV. CONCLUSION
Anderson-Burdick developed through a line of cases notable for their
lack of clarity, with the Supreme Court’s plurality and dissenting opinions
in Crawford leaving the lower courts left to their own devices when
determining how it should be applied. Nevertheless, the utility of
Anderson-Burdick is evidenced by its application in a wide range of
voting rights and election law cases in the lower courts. Whether voting
rights are under attack from societal pressures caused by an external event
like the pandemic, or political pressures such as the increasing partisan
divide animating voting rights legislation and litigation, AndersonBurdick’s doctrinal validity ensures that lower courts will continue to use
it to resolve these cases.
Thus, rather than discarding Anderson-Burdick, the Court should
clarify its application and insist that lower courts rigorously interrogate
the government’s proffered interest to determine if it truly warrants the
burden the contested law imposes on voters. This would respect the
principle of stare decisis, resolve the conflicting interpretations resulting
from the opinion in Crawford, and render the amorphous test more easily
applied—all without sacrificing the inherent flexibility necessary for
adjudication of varied and complex election litigation, particularly arising
in times of crisis. Further, courts’ abilities to apply Anderson-Burdick in
conjunction with other forms of constitutional analyses will ensure
dynamic and enduring protections for voters’ rights in future challenges
beyond the pandemic.
The issues discussed in this Comment may soon be resolved with
guidance from the Supreme Court. In October, the Court consolidated two

163. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971).
164. Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020).
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election law cases from the Ninth Circuit165 and granted certiorari.166 The
case will review two en banc opinions from the Ninth Circuit, which
found that a state law barring ballot harvesting and an Arizona policy
requiring voters to vote at their assigned precinct167 each violated § 2 of
the VRA due to their disproportionate impact on minorities.168 By
granting certiorari in these cases, the Court will have an opportunity to
rule on vote denial claims arising under § 2, and may also revisit
Anderson-Burdick for the first time since Crawford.169 While these cases
all originated prior to the pandemic, the Court’s resolution of the case is
likely to grant much-needed clarity in this area of election law.

165. The cases below are Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020), cert.
granted sub nom. Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020), and cert.
granted sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020).
166. Amy Howe, Justices Add Seven New Cases to Docket, Including Major Voting Rights Dispute,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/justices-add-seven-new-cases-todocket-including-major-voting-rights-dispute/.
167. Ballots of voters who vote at a precinct other than which they are assigned are destroyed.
168. Howe, supra note 166.
169. Id.
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